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In this paper we analyze disinflation in two environments. One in which the central bank has perfect 
knowledge, in the sense that it understands and observes the process by which private sector inflation 
expectations are generated, and one in which the central bank has to learn the private sector inflation 
forecasting rule. Here, the learning scheme we investigate is that of least-squares learning (recursive OLS) 
using the Kalman filter. With imperfect knowledge, results depend on the learning scheme that is employed. 
A novel feature of the passive learning policy - compared to the central bank’s  disinflation policy under 
perfect knowledge - is that the degree of monetary accommodation (the extent to which the central bank 
accommodates private sector inflation expectations) is no longer constant across the disinflation, but 
becomes state-dependent. This means that the central bank’s behaviour changes during the disinflation as it 
collects more information.  
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As pointed out by Bullard (1991), in the three decades since the publication of the seminal work on rational 
expectations (RE) in the early 1960s, a steely paradigm was forged in the economics profession regarding 
acceptable modelling procedures. Simply stated, the paradigm was that economic actors do not persist in 
making foolish mistakes in forecasting over time.  
Since the late 1980s researchers have challenged this paradigm by examining the idea that how systematic 
forecast errors are eliminated may have important implications for macroeconomic policy. Researchers who 
have focused on this question have been studying what is called ‘learning’, because any method of 
expectations formation is known as a learning mechanism. Thus, since the late 1980s a learning literature, or 
learning paradigm, developed.
2 An excellent introduction to – and survey of – this paradigm is presented in 
Evans and Honkapohja (2001).  
A different strand of literature in the economics profession has been dealing with optimal control or dynamic 
optimisation. The method of dynamic programming advanced by Bellman has been a main tool for 
optimisation over time under uncertainty. 
In general there are few papers in the literature that combine the themes of learning and (optimal) control. 
An exception is recent and important work by Wieland (2000a,b). Wieland (2000a) analyses the situation 
where a central bank has limited information concerning the transmission channel of monetary policy. Then, 
the CB is faced with the difficult task of simultaneously controlling the policy target and estimating 
(learning) the impact of policy actions. Thus, the so-called separation principle does not hold, and a trade-
off between estimation and control arises because policy actions influence estimation (learning) and provide 
information that may improve future performance. Wieland analyses this trade-off in a simple model with 
parameter uncertainty and conducts dynamic simulations of the central bank’s decision problem.  
 
In this paper we apply the themes of learning and control to the problem of how a central bank should 
organize a disinflation process, i.e. how to reduce inflation. Thus, our approach follows recent relevant 
work by Sargent (1999). 
 
Central banks throughout the world are moving to adopt long-run price stability as their primary goal. Thus, 
there is agreement among central bankers, academics and financial market representatives that low or zero 
inflation is the appropriate long-run goal of monetary policy. However, there is less agreement on what 
strategies should be adopted to achieve price stability. For example, on the one hand we have the view that 
a major cause of rising unemployment in the 1980s in OECD countries was the tight monetary policy that 
those countries pursued to reduce inflation. On the other we have the view that a sharp disinflation may be 
preferable to gradualism because the latter invites speculation about future reversals or U-turns in policy.  
 
The received view in the literature - as expressed by King (1996) at the Kansas City Fed symposium on 
Achieving Price Stability at Jackson Hole - seems to be for a gradual timetable, with inflation targets 
consistently set below the public's inflation expectations. 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper is forthcoming as a Bank of Finland Discussion Paper. It was written while I was a 
visiting scholar at the Research Department of the Bank of Finland, which I thank for their hospitality. The views 
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland. I am grateful for helpful 
comments by Seppo Honkapohja, Juha Tarkka, Marco Hoeberichts, David Mayes, Jouko Vilmunen, Martin Ellison, Alain 
Kabundi, Justin Prentice, Karim Sadrieh and seminar participants at the Bank of Finland, Tilburg University and RAU. 
2 Important papers are Lucas (1987) and Marcet and Sargent (1988, 1989a,b,c).   3
 
King shows how the optimal speed of disinflation depends crucially on whether the private sector 
immediately believes in the new low inflation regime or not. If they do, the best strategy is to disinflate 
quickly, since the output costs are zero. Of course, if expectations are slower to adapt, disinflation should be 
more gradual as well.  
 
A central bank may try to convince the private sector of its commitment to price stability by choosing to 
reduce its inflation target towards the inflation target quickly. King calls this ‘teaching by doing’. Then the 
choice of a particular inflation rate influences the speed at which expectations adjust to price stability.  
 
Teaching by doing effects have recently been analyzed by Hoeberichts and Schaling (2000) for simple 
macro models with both linear and nonlinear (convex) Phillips curves. They also allow the central bank's 
‘doing’ to affect private sector forecasting. Of course, if the CB recognizes its potential for active ‘teaching’ 
its incentive structure changes. More specific, it should realize that by disinflating faster, it can reduce the 
associated output costs by ‘teaching’ the private sector that it means business. Thus, the dependence of 
private sector expectations on the actual inflation rate should be part of its optimization problem. This is in 
fact what they find: allowing for ‘teaching by doing’ effects always speeds up the disinflation vis-à-vis the 
case where this effect is absent. So, their result is that ‘speed’ in the disinflation process does not necessarily 
‘kill’ in the sense of creating large output losses. 
 
In this paper we analyze disinflation in two environments. One in which the central bank has perfect 
knowledge, in the sense that it understands and observes the process by which private sector inflation 
expectations are generated, and one in which the central bank has to learn the private sector inflation 
forecasting rule. Here following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), the learning scheme we investigate is that of 
least-squares learning (recursive OLS) using the Kalman filter. 
 
For the case of perfect knowledge we find that the optimal disinflation is faster under commitment than 
discretion. Next, in the commitment case the disinflation is less gradual, the higher the central bank’s rate of 
time preference and – interestingly – the higher the degree of persistence in inflation expectations.  
 
With imperfect knowledge results depend on the learning scheme that is employed. A novel feature of the 
passive learning policy - compared to the central bank’s optimal disinflation policy under perfect knowledge 
- is that the degree of monetary accommodation (the extent to which the central bank accommodates private 
sector inflation expectations) is no longer constant across the disinflation, but becomes state-dependent. This 
means that the central bank’s behaviour changes during the disinflation as it collects more information.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses private sector behaviour regarding 
the credibility of the central bank’s inflation target. In section 3 we present the benchmark case of perfect 
knowledge and contrast discretion and commitment. Imperfect knowlegde and the Kalman filter are 
introduced in section 4. Section 5 analyzes disinflation policies under imperfect knowledge. We conclude in 
section 6. The appendices contain the derivation of steady state relationships, the commitment solution, and 
the derivation of the Kalman filter equations used in the main text. 
   4
2 THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
In this section we examine the speed of disinflation that would be chosen by a central bank in a world in 
which monetary policy affects real output in the short run but not in the long run. We use a simple 
macroeconomic model that combines nominal wage and price stickiness and slow adjustment of 
expectations to a new monetary policy regime. The model has three key equations – for monetary policy 
preferences, aggregate supply, and inflation expectations. 
 
Suppose monetary policy is conducted by a central bank with inflation and output targets 
* p  and 
* z . 
Interpret monetary policy as implying that the central bank’s objective in period tis to choose a sequence of 
current and future inflation rates { }
¥
=t t t p so as to minimize 
 
( ) t t
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-                     (2.1) 
 
where t E denotes expectations conditional upon (the central bank’s) information available in year t, the 
discount factor is defined as ( )
1 1
- + = r d  and fulfils  1 0 < <d  (where r denotes the discount rate), and 
the period loss function  ( ) t t p z L ,  is           
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2
1 2 * 2 * z z a - + - t t p p      
 
where p is the inflation rate in year t, z is the natural logarithm of output, while  0<a<¥ represents the 
central bank’s relative weight on inflation stabilization. In what follows we set 
* z equal to the natural rate of 
output (which in turn is normalized to zero). 
 
The model is simple. Aggregate supply exceeds the natural rate of output when inflation is higher than was 
expected by agents when nominal contracts were set. This is captured by a simple short-run Phillips curve. 
t t t t E z p p
^
1 - - =   (2.2) 
 
Where z  is the natural logarithm of the output gap.
3 Here the superscript ^ indicates that the expectation of 
inflation is the subjective expectation (belief) of private agents. This belief does not necessarily coincide with 
a rational expectation. 
 
Private agents believe that inflation will be reduced from its initial level towards the inflation target, but are 
not sure by how much. More specific, the public’s inflation beliefs are given by  
 
t t u + =
* p p   (2.3) 
 
                                                 
3 It would be straightforward to extend the Phillips curve with an aggregate supply shock. Standard assumptions on 
nominal rigidities would then imply that inflation expectations are set before the shock is observed, while monetary policy 
would bet set in full knowledge of the shock to output.   5
where u is a  shock to the inflation rate. So, we assume that equation (2.3) is the perceived law of motion 
of private agents. 
In order to study changes in inflation expectations, we extend this system with a stochastic process for u. 























p              where 
*
0 0 p p p - < <
b    (2.4) 
 
If  0 ﬁ
b p there is no difference between the two regimes, and so we can think of 
b p as scaling the effect of 
the difference in inflation beliefs in the two regimes. In the case where the parameter  0 ﬁ
b p , there is a 
completely credible regime switch. Thus, 
b p  is a measure for the extent to which the public’s beliefs (and 
consequently expectations) about inflation are uncoupled from the intended policy objective.
4 Figure 2.1 
illustrates.  
 
Figure 2.1 The Perceived Law of Motion for Inflation 
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p is the private sector’s perceived law of motion of the inflation rate,  0 p  is the initial inflation rate and 
b
L a p = is the difference in inflation beliefs in the two regimes. 
 
The unobserved state of the system  t s  takes on a value of zero or one, and follows a two-state Markov 
process.















                                                 
4 I have borrowed this terminology from Orphanides and Williams (2002). Or, using a term from the older time-consistency 
literature, it can be seen as a measure for the lack of ‘credibility’ of the CB’s inflation target. 
5 We adopt the usual convention that for discrete-valued variables, capital letters denote the random variable and small 
letters a particular realization. If both interpretations apply we will use small letters.   6
[ ] , 1 1 Pr 1 p S S ob t t = = = +  
[ ] , 1 1 0 Pr 1 p S S ob t t - = = = +   (2.5)   
[ ] , 0 0 Pr 1 q S S ob t t = = = +    
[ ] q S S ob t t - = = = + 1 0 1 Pr 1  
 
So the probability of remaining in the high (low) state conditional on being in the high (low) state in the 
previous period is  p (q), and the probability of switching from the high (low) to the low (high) state is 
q - 1 ( p - 1 ).  
 
As suggested by Hamilton (1989), the stochastic process for equation (2.5) admits the following AR(1) 
representation: 
 
1 1 ) 1 ( + + + + - = t t t v s q s g   (2.6) 
 





We want to study the dynamics of the system following a switch to a new regime, which in our model will 
constitute a switch from one state to the other. We are particularly interested in the effects of this switch on 
the dynamics of private sector inflation beliefs. 
 
3 OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY UNDER PERFECT KNOWLEDGE  
 
To get some straightforward results, we assume that the central bank understands and observes the process 
by which private sector inflation expectations are generated. This is the benchmark case of perfect 
knowledge. We model least-squares learning by the central bank in section 4.  
 
Consider a switch from a monetary policy regime in which inflation has averaged  0 p  to a regime of price 
stability in which inflation equals the inflation target 
* p . What is the optimal transition path? That will depend 
upon how quickly private sector inflation expectations adjust to the new regime. Following King (1996), it is 
useful to consider two cases: (1) a completely credible policy regime switch: private sector expectations 
adjust immediately to the new policy reaction function – this is the case of rational or model consistent 
expectations; (2) ‘endogenous forecasting’: the private sector’s forecasting rule depends on the policy 
choices made in the new regime.  
 
With a completely credible regime change, private sector inflation expectations are consistent with the new 
inflation target. From equation (2.4) it can be seen that this is the case where  0 =




p p = - t t E .  Hence output and inflation are given by  0 = t z  and 
* p p = t . Since the level of output is 
independent of the inflation rate, policy can aim at price stability without any expected output loss. The 
optimal policy is to move immediately to the inflation target. 
 
                                                 
6 For the technical details see Appendix A.   7
The more general case is that of ‘endogenous forecasting’ by the private sector. We define endogenous 
forecasting as the case where the private sector’s forecasting rule depends on the policy choices made in the 
new regime.  
To see that this in fact the relevant situation in our model, we apply ( L g - 1 ) where Lis the lag operator 
( j t t
j x x L - = ) to (2.3) and take account of (2.6), 
 
* ) 1 ( ) 1 .( ) 1 ( p g g p p g - + - = - t
b
t s L L   (3.1) 
 




t t v q . ) 1 .( ) 1 (
*
1 p p p g gp p + - + - + = -   (3.2) 
 
Hence, the combination of the private sector’s perceived law of motion (equation (2.3)) and the AR(1) 
representation of the inflation state (equation (2.6)) gives rise to a first-order stochastic difference equation 
for inflation.  
 
Taking expectations at time  1 - t  of equation (3.2), where the expectations operator 
^
E refers to agents’ 
subjective expectations, we obtain 
 






t t t - + - + = - - p p g gp p   (3.3) 
 
Our main finding is that the private sector’s optimal inflation forecast - in an environment where the 
perceived law of motion is one with unobserved regime shifts – involves a lagged inflation term. More 
precise, at time  1 - t  private agents’ inflation expectations for period t are a linear function of the inflation 
target, the lagged inflation rate and a constant, where the coefficients are functions of the structural 
parameters of the Markov switching process, as shown in equation (3.3). Thus, indeed the private sector’s 
forecasting rule depends on the policy choices made in the new monetary policy regime; this can be seen 
from the presence of the  1 - t p  term.  
 
An important limiting case of equation (3.3) is when  0 = =
b p g . In this case the shock to inflation becomes 




Now we solve the model for the case where the central bank does not internalize the constraint (3.3). This is 
equivalent to the case where  0 ﬁ d . In this discretionary case the minimization problem of the central bank 
reduces to the static problem 
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The associated optimal policy is  












=   (3.5.1) 
 
Where  t t t E x p 1
^
- = . The optimal transition to price stability is to allow inflation to fall gradually. The 
inflation rate should decline as a constant proportion of the exogenously expected inflation rate. That 
proportion depends on the weight aattached to the importance of keeping inflation close to the inflation 
target relative to keeping output close to its natural rate. The inflation rate moves gradually to the level of the 
inflation target, but is always below expected inflation. Figure 3.2 shows an example in which expectations 
decline steadily. Note that inflation adjusts to its long-run value gradually over time. 
 



















p               (3.5.2) 
 
It can be easily seen that the greater the central bank’s weight on inflation stabilization, the smaller the first-
order autocorrelation in inflation. The persistence of inflation has a limiting value approaching g (where g is 
a function of the structural parameters of the Markov switching process, i.e.  1 - + ” q p g ) when a 
approaches zero, and zero when a approaches infinity.  That is, if the central bank cares only about output 
stabilization – that is engages in a policy of full accommodation  - the inflation rate becomes highly persistent. 
Conversely, if the central bank cares only about inflation stabilization –that is follows a ‘cold turkey’ strategy 
- the inflation rate displays no serial correlation. It is clear that in the first extreme all output loss is eliminated, 
but at the cost of inflation falling only at the exogenous rate of decline of private sector inflation expectations, 
while in the second case price stability is achieved even during the transition period, but only at the cost of an 








* .  
3.2 Commitment  
 
In his discussion of what we term endogenous forecasting, King (1996, p. 68) says that there are good 
reasons for the private sector to suppose that in trying to learn about the future inflation rate many of the 
relevant factors are exogenous to the path of inflation itself. But a central bank may try to convince the 
private sector of its commitment to price stability by choosing to reduce its inflation target towards the 
inflation target quickly. King calls this ‘teaching by doing’. Then the choice of a particular inflation rate 
influences the speed at which expectations adjust to price stability. 
 
In this section we allow the central bank's ‘doing’ to affect private sector forecasting. Of course, if the CB 
recognises its potential for active ‘teaching’ its incentive structure changes. More specific, it should realise 
that by disinflating faster, it can reduce the associated output costs by ‘teaching’ the private sector that it 
means business. Thus, the dependence of private sector expectations on the actual inflation rate - equation 
(3.3) above - should be part of its optimisation problem. In what follows we refer to this as the case of 
‘commitment’. 
 
Now, the central bank’s problem is to choose { }
¥
=t t t p  so as to maximize 
   9
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t t t t E z p p
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t t t - + - + = - - p p g gp p     (3.3) 
 
It is convenient to define  t t t E x p 1
^
- = as the state variable and  t t u p =  as the control. We solve this 
problem by the method of Lagrange multipliers.
7 Introduce the Lagrange multiplier  t m , and set to zero the 
derivatives of the Lagrangean expression: 
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We now turn to a calibrated case to illustrate our results. Table 3.1 summarizes the parameter values used in 
our calibrated economy. 
 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of the relative merits of the methods of dynamic programming and Lagrange, see Schaling (2001).  
8 See Bullard and Schaling (2001) and Schaling (2002) for examples of the method of solving for the optimal policy.    10
Table 3.1 Parameter Configuration
1 
Parameter  Controls  Value 
p   Probability of remaining in 
the high inflation state 
conditional on being in 
the high inflation state 
0.95 
q  Probability of remaining in 
the low inflation state 
conditional on being in 
the low inflation state 
0.95 
g  Persistence in PS inflation 
expectations 
0.9 
b b p p =   Difference in PS inflation 
beliefs 
13 
0 p   Initial inflation rate  20 
* p   Central bank’s  inflation 
target 
2.5  
a  Central bank’s inflation 
aversion 
0.2 
d  Discount factor  0.9 
1 C   Optimal degree of 
monetary accommodation 
0.71 
2 C   Reduced form 
(equilibrium) constant 
0.48 
1We illustrate our analytical findings using these calibrations.  
 
Using the above parameter values, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the discretionary and commitment disinflation 
policy respectively.  
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From Figure 3.3 it can be seen that disinflation under commitment is always faster than under discretion.  
 
The reason is that the choice of a particular inflation rate influences the speed at which expectations adjust. 
In fact, a quicker disinflation policy ‘pays for itself’ by speeding up the adjustment of expectations. Of 
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to think about this, is that central bank credibility - a crucial variable in defining the output loss of the 
disinflation - here is endogenous. In fact, the central bank's credibility can be increased by the CB by starting 
off the disinflation by putting its money where its mouth is. 
 
From equations (B.15) and (B.16) it can be seen that the optimal values of the coefficients are nonlinear 
functions of the central bank’s weight on inflation stabilization, the discount rate and the degree of 
persistence in inflation expectations.   
 
More specific, we now show:
9 
 
PROPOSITION B.1: The higher athe lower the optimal value of the feedback parameter  1 C . 
 
For the proof, see Appendix B. The argument is as follows. A central bank that is more concerned with 
inflation will be less concerned with output, and hence will accommodation inflation expectations to a lesser 
extent. To give a numerical example, for our basic parameter configuration (see Table 3.1),  71 . 0 1 » C . If 
we increase a to 0.5 , say,  1 C  decreases to  0.55. 
 
We can also derive a result in terms of the central bank’s degree of time preference. In Appendix B we 
verify: 
 
PROPOSITION B.2: If  1 C  is smaller than an upper bound 
_
1 C , the higher d the lower the optimal value 
of the feedback parameter  1 C . 
 
The intuition is that the higher d, the more concerned the central bank is about the future, i.e. the longer is 
its policy horizon (conversely if this parameter is zero, the central bank only ‘lives for today’). Under a live 
for today policy, the central bank is not interested how monetary accommodation today effects inflation 
expectations for tomorrow. If it becomes more concerned about the future (higher d) however, it will start 
paying attention to expected future ‘expectations invoices’, and accommodate current inflation expectations 
to a lesser extent, hence the monetary accommodation coefficient  1 C  falls. To give a numerical example for 
our basic parameter configuration (see Table 3.1) and  225 . 0 = d ,  81 . 0 1 » C . If we increase d to 0.9, say, 
1 C  decreases to 0.71 (see above)  
 
Let us now look how the central bank responds to less faith in its inflation target, as proxied by a higher 
weight placed on past inflation by private agents in forecasting future inflation. This is the case of more 
persistence in inflation expectations. It is easy to show: 
 
PROPOSITION B3: If  1 C  is smaller than an upper bound 
_
1 C , the higher g the lower the optimal value of 
the feedback parameter  1 C . 
 
The argument is that the higher g, the better agents ‘remember’ past inflation rates, and use those to 
forecast future inflation. If the central bank cares about the future ( 0 „ d ), it will try to offset this ‘memory 
effect’ by less monetary accommodation. In this way it lets the lower inflation outcomes influence the level 
of expectations to try to offset the higher persistence of those expectations. For example, for our basic 
                                                 
9 Additional results (propositions) are presented in Appendix B.   13
parameter configuration (see Table 3.1) and  2 . 0 = g ,  83 . 0 1 » C . If we increasegto 0.9,  1 C  decreases to 
0.71.  
By substituting (3.3) into (3.6) we can derive the solution for the inflation process under commitment 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] 2
*
1 1 1 1 1 C q C C
b
t t + - + - + = - p p g gp p               (3.7) 
 
It can be easily seen that the greater the parameter  1 C , the greater the first-order autocorrelation in inflation. 
Since this parameter is decreasing in the central bank’s weight on inflation stabilization a (see proposition 
B.1), the greater the central bank’s weight on inflation stabilization, the smaller the first-order autocorrelation 
in inflation (a similar result as under discretion). Similarly, according to proposition B.2, the higher the central 
bank’s discount factor d, the lower the optimal value of the parameter  1 C . Thus, if the central bank 
becomes more concerned about the future (the longer its policy horizon and the higher d), the lower the 
persistence of inflation.   
Finally, from proposition B.3 we know that the feedback parameter  1 C is decreasing in the parameter g. 
Therefore, the dependence of the degree of inflation persistence on g is given by 
( ) 1 1 1 ) / ( / C C C + ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ g g g g , where the sign is ambiguous.  
 
4 IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE, FILTERING AND PREDICTION 
 
The case of perfect knowledge can be represented as follows.  First, at time  1 - t  the central bank sets its 
expectation (forecast) for private sector inflation expectations. Next, also at time  1 - t  the private sector sets 
its forecast,  t x , of inflation for period t. Then, the CB sets inflation at time t based on its own forecast, 
where - importantly - the forecast turns out to be correct. Figure 4.1 summarizes. 
 
Figure 4.1 Perfect Knowledge: Timing of Events 
Time  1 - t   Time t 
Stage 1: 
 
•  CB forecasts PS inflation 
expectations; i.e. sets 
[ ] t t x E 1 - . 
Stage 2:  
 
•  PS forecasts inflation using 
equation (3.3), i.e. sets  t x . 
Stage 3:  
 
•  CB decides on monetary 
policy, i.e. sets 
[ ] ( ) ( )
* *
1 , , p p p p t t t t t x x E = -
, on the basis of either 
discretion or ‘commitment’. 
 
Of course, the idea that the CB can forecast  t x  without error is hardly realistic. This assumption will now be 
relaxed. 
 
4.1 The Kalman Filter 
 
Suppose the CB can no longer forecast private agents’ inflation expectations t x without error. Assume that 
the CB has a forecast  t t y E 1 - at time  1 - t  of  t x  which it subsequently uses to set the inflation rate  t p at time 
t.  
 
More specifically, let  t y  be the CB’s noisy signal on  t x  
 
t t t x y e + =   (4.1)   14
 
where  t y  is the central bank’s signal of t x , and  t e  is its measurement error. The only information available 
to the CB when it sets policy at time tis its forecast of  y which is conditional on past values of  y ; i.e. 
[ ] [ ] ,... 2 , 1 , 1 = = - - n y y E t y E n t t t . Even ex post the CB cannot observe separately the two components of 
y , xand e. We assume the measurement error is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
2
e s . 
So, the central bank’s signal is unbiased, but not without error. An important limiting case of (4.1) is when 
0
2 ﬁ e s  and we are back to the previous case of perfect knowledge, i.e.  t t x y = .  
 
To make the problem more tractable we set  ( ) [ ]
b b q p p g g p ” - - - = 1 / 1
* . Then, 
b p is no longer a free 
parameter (on those occasions the symbol 
b p  is used).  This assumption has the advantage of reducing the 
dimension of the state space in the central bank’s optimal filtering problem. In this way we avoid what 




b b p p = and defining  t t t E x p 1
^
- ” , equation (3.3) simplifies to 
 
( ) 1 1 1 - - = + = t t t w x g p g     where  ) 1 ( 1 1 + ” - - t t w p                  (3.4) 
 
Note that the situation above can be represented as the case where the CB believes that private sector 
inflation expectations follow the stochastic process  
 
t t t cw y e + = -1     (4.2) 
   
corresponding to the true (actual) law of motion of PS inflation expectations, but that gis unknown to them 
(this can be seen by substituting the expression for private sector inflation expectations (3.4) into equation 
(4.1)). Thus, here we assume that the central bank employs a reduced form of the expectations formation 
process that is correctly specified.
11   
 
So, we assume that equation (4.2) is the perceived law of motion of the central bank and that the 
policymaker attempts to estimate g. Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), this is our key bounded 
rationality assumption: we back away from the rational expectations assumption, replacing it with the 
assumption that, in forecasting private sector inflation expectations, the central bank acts like an 
econometrician. 
 
The central bank’s estimates will be updated over time as more information is collected. Letting  1 - t c  denote 
its estimate through time  1 - t , the central bank’s one-step-ahead forecast at  1 - t , is given by 
                                                 
10 For the technical details see Appendix D. In addition, we then choose the parameter  0 p in such a way that the 
inequality   
*
0 0 p p p - < <
b (see equation (2.4) ) remains satisfied. Note that Wieland (2000a,b) studies the problem of a 
single decision maker, who attempts to control a linear stochastic process with two unknown parameters. Using the 
notation of this paper Wieland considers the stochastic process  t t t y e bp a + + = .  Thus, in his framework there are 
no lagged dependent variables. As a consequence all dynamics in Wieland (2000a,b) are due to learning.  
11 Instead - as pointed out by Orphanides and Williams (2002) - the learner may be uncertain of the correct from and 
estimate a more general specification, for example, in our case a linear regression with additional lags of expected inflation 
which nests (4.2).    15
 
1 1 1 ] [ - - - = t t t t w c y E   (4.3) 
 
Under this assumption we have the following model of the evolution of the economy. Define  1 - ” t t w z , and 
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1 , ,... - - = t t z z Z  is a vector compressing  1 - t  successive observations of the explanatory variable.. 
Given the new information, which is provided by the observations  t t z y , , we wish to form a revised or 
updated estimate of g. Using data through period t, the least squares regression parameter for equation 
(4.2) can be written in recursive form (see Appendix D for details) 
 
( ) 1 1 1 - - - - + = t t t t t t c w y c c k     (4.4) 




- = e s k t t t w p     (D.10) 
 
The method by which the revised estimate of gis obtained may be described as a filtering process, which 




- = e s k t t t w p  may be 
described as the gain of the filter, i.e. the Kalman gain.  
 
Equations (4.4) and (4.5) are known as the updating, or smoothing equations. These updating equations 
represent the learning channel, through which the current policy action  t p
12 affects next period’s estimate 
or beliefs  1 + t q , whereq is a 1 x 2 row vector of state variables containing the mean and variance of the 
estimate, i.e.  [ ]' t t t p c = q .  
 
5 CENTRAL BANK LEARNING AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 
 
We now examine how the nature of monetary policy is affected by learning considerations. Under imperfect 
knowledge the central bank maximizes 
 
[ ]
2 2 * ) ( ) ( t t t
t
t p p d z E a E
t
t
t - - - ￿
¥
=




t t t t t y E z E 1 - - =p                     (C.2) 
 
and the Kalman filter equations (4.3)-(4.5) and (D.10): 
                                                 
12 Note that  1 - = t t w p . 
13 Our one-period objective function differs from Wieland (2000b, p. 506) who – using the notation of this paper – 
considers  ( ) ( )
2 2 * , p p a y y y U - - - = . Thus, in his set-up both the control pand the signal   y , affect the agent’s 
pay-off. For  0 = a  his objective function coincides with the input-target model that is often used in studies of learning 
by doing [e.g. Jovanovich and Nyarko (1996) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995)].   16
 
( ) 1 1 1 1 ] [ - - - + = t t t t c y E p   (4.3) 
( ) t t t t t t y E y c c 1 1 - - - + = k   (4.4’)
14 
( ) 1 1 1 1 - - - + - = t t t t t p p p p k   (4.5) 





























t p   (D.10) 
 
Now the timing of events is as follows. First, at time  1 - t  the central bank sets its expectation (forecast) for 
private sector inflation expectations according to equation (4.3). Here the ordinary least squares estimate 
1 - t c  of gin the model ( )
2
2 1 , , ; e s g - - t t w y  has been calculated on the basis of (4.4) and (4.5); that is using 
values for  2 1 1 2 , , , - - - - t t t t w y c k (where I have used  t w as shorthand for ( ) 1 1 - + t p ). Next, also at time  1 - t  
private sector inflation expectations for period t,  t x , are determined by  1 - t w and the true parameter 
gaccording to equation (3.4).  
 
Then, the CB sets inflation at time tbased on its own forecast. Also, in period t given the new information 
provided by  1 , - t t w y , the central bank forms a revised or updated estimate of g.  
 
Note that the Kalman gain (D.10), is a nonlinear function of the central bank’s control variable. Hence, the 
updating equations (4.4) and (4.5) are also nonlinear in the inflation rate. These updating equations represent 
the learning channel, through which the current policy choice  t p  affects next period’s parameter estimate 
1 + t c and the associated prediction  1 + t ty E .  
 





- - + ” t t p p s s e in the Kalman 
gain. Here  ( )
2
1 1 1 - - + t t p p is the portion of the prediction error variance due to uncertainty in  1 - t c  and 
2
e s is 
the portion of the prediction error variance due to the random shock  t e . Thus, it is nothing else than the 
inverse of the signal to noise ratio. We can easily see that  , 0 / < ¶ ¶ s kt  suggesting that as the amount of 
noise in the signal  t y increases, relatively less weight is given to new information in the prediction error, 
( ) t t t y E y 1 - - . This is quite intuitive, since an increase in the noise may be interpreted as a deterioration of 
the information content of  ( ) t t t y E y 1 - - relative to  1 - t c . Similarly, if the amount of noise that is contaminating 
the signal diminishes, more weight will be given to new information relative to the previous estimate  1 - t c . 
 
The model has two important limiting cases. One limiting case is the one where the noise to signal ratio goes 
to infinity. Then, new observations are so noisy that they are essentially useless, and play no role in updating 

















s p s s
   
 
                                                 
14 Where I have substituted  t t y E 1 - for  ( ) 1 11 - - + t t c p  using equation (4.3).   17
Substituting this expression into the updating equation (4.4) gives  0 1 c c c t t = = - . Hence, this is the case 
where the central bank engages in forecasting or prediction,  
 
( ) 1 0 1 1 ] [ - - + = t t t c y E p   (4.3) 
 
but not in updating. Note that in this case the separation principle holds, as the central bank’s optimal 
estimation of the state g, no longer depends on policy outcomes. Note that the model can then be solved 
for either discretion or commitment. 
 
The mirror image of the previous situation is the case where the new observations are not polluted by any 
noise. Then, the central bank should just set policy based on its most recent observation  t y . In this case the 
relevant limit of the Kalman gain is given by 
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c   (5.1) 
 
In this case at time  1 - t the central bank would be able to forecast private sector inflation expectations 
perfectly, and then at time tset policy based on its forecast. So, this case is nothing else but the case of 
perfect knowledge analyzed in section 3. Note that in this case - unlike Wieland (2000b) - the optimization 
problem is still dynamic, the optimal policy would be the commitment policy of section 3.2. Only in the case 
where  0 = =d s  does the optimization problem reduce to the static discretionary problem of section 3.1. 
 
5.1 Optimal Learning and the Value of Experimentation 
 
We now turn to the case where estimation and control are not separated. Of course, estimation and control 
cannot be separated because parameter updates and forecasts depend on past monetary policy choices. 
The effect of policy on future estimates and forecasts is also apparent from the Bellman equation associated 
with this dynamic programming problem: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
'
1
' ' , max t t t t t t t x V E x r x V
t
+ + = d p
p
    (5.2) 
Where the vector of state variables is  ( ) t t t t t t t p y c y E x , , , , 1
' k + = ,pis the control and r is the one-period 
return function. 
 
Folllowing Wieland (2000b), it can easily be seen that the two terms on the right hand side characterize the 
tradeoff between current control and estimation (which here is used as an umbrella term to include 
prediction). The first term is current expected reward, while the second term is the expected continuation 
value in the next period, which reflects the expected improvement in future payoffs due to better information   18
about the unknown parameter.  
 
Note that if  0 ﬁ d  the central bank only ‘lives for today’, and is not interested to consider the effects of its 
policy actions on future payoffs. Then there is no horse race, and the optimal policy is simply to maximize the 
one-period return function. In that case the optimal policy is simply the discretionary solution, which under 
imperfect knowledge is presented in section 5.3.1 below. 
 
As shown by Easley and Kiefer (1988) and Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) an optimal feedback rule exists and 
the value function is continuous and satisfies the Bellman equation.
15 Policy and value functions can be 
obtained using an iterative algortihm based on the Bellman equation starting with an initial guess about 
( ) . V .
16 However, analytical solutions are not feasible because the dynamic contraint of the optimization 
problem associated with the Kalman filter is highly nonlinear. As pointed out by Wieland (2000b), there are 
many examples, including Wieland (2000a,b), Ellison and Valla (2001) for which no analytical solutions 
have been found even though the unknown stochastic process is linear and the return function is quadratic.  
 
5.2 The Case of Passive Learning  
 
In order to get some analytical results, we now consider the case of passive learning. This is the case 
where the central bank disregards the effect of current policy actions on future estimation and prediction. In 
this case the policy maker treats control and estimation separately. As pointed out by Bertocchi and Spagat 
(1993) in this case learning is passive in the sense that there is no experimentation.  
The central bank will first choose  t p  to minimise the expected loss based on its current parameter estimate 
(its belief about g). Then, a white noise shock  t e occurs and a new realization  t y  can be observed. Before 
choosing next period’s control  1 + t p the central bank will proceed by updating its estimate (belief) using the 
new information ( ) t t y , p . Figure 5.1 summarizes. 
 
                                                 
15 As pointed out by Wieland (2000b), one can use standard dynamic programming methods and show that Blackwell’s 
sufficiency condition – monotonicity and discounting – are satisfied. Thus, equation (5.2) has a fixed point in the space of 
continuous functions, which is the value function  ( )
' x V . 
16 A typical algorithm is described in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), Chapter 3.   19
Figure 5.1 Passive Learning: Timing of Events 
Time  1 - t   Time t 
Stage 1:  
 
•  CB forecasts PS 
inflation expectations 
using  1 - t c  and  1 - t w , 
i.e. sets 
[ ] [ ] t t t t y E x E 1 1 - - = .  
Stage 2:  
 
•  PS forecasts inflation 
using  1 - t w  and g, i.e. 
sets  t x . 
 
Stage 3:  
 
•  3a) CB decides on 
monetary policy, i.e. sets 
[ ] ( )
*
1 ,p p t t t y E - , on the 
basis of either discretion 
or ‘commitment’ 
•  3b) Nature chooses  t e , 
and  t t t x y e + =  
realizes. 
•  3c) CB observes t y and 
forms a revised estimate 
t c . 
Stage 4:  
 
•  Back to stage 1, for 
time  1 + = t t  etc. 
 
 
As pointed out by Wieland (2000b) this behaviour is myopic since it disregards the effect of current policy 




As before first we consider the case where the central bank does not internalize its ‘teaching by doing’, that 
is the case where  0 ﬁ d . In this discretionary case the central bank will choose  t p  to minimise the 
expected one-period loss 
 
[ ]
2 2 * ) ( ) (
2
1
t t t t z E a E - - - p p     (5.3) 
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= -     (5.4) 
 
 
So, we find that the optimal policy rule is the one where the central bank should partially accommodate its 
forecast of private sector inflation expectations. Using equation (4.3) in the expression above, this policy 
can also be expressed in terms of a response to the determinants of this forecast, namely past inflation and 




















-   (5.5) 
 
Compared to the decision rule in (3.5.2) the parameter gis replaced by its point estimate  1 - t c .    20
A novel feature of the passive learning policy - compared to the central bank’s discretionary disinflation 
policy under perfect knowledge - is that the degree of monetary accommodation (the extent to which the 
central bank accommodates private sector inflation expectations) is no longer constant across the 
disinflation, but becomes state-dependent. This means that the central bank’s behaviour changes during the 
disinflation as it collects more information. This can be easily seen from equation (5.5) where the monetary 




Now we turn to the case where the central bank internalizes the effects of today’s monetary accommodation 
on tomorrow’s inflation expectations.  To solve this problem, first we derive the central bank’s policy rule 
( )
*
1 ,p p t t t y E - , which selects an action based on the current state  t t y E 1 - . Given a specification of the central 
bank’s forecast, given by the Kalman filter equations this policy rule can be derived analytically. Formally, 
the central bank’s control problem is now to maximize 
 
[ ]
2 2 * ) ( ) ( t t t
t
t p p d z E a E
t
t
t - - - ￿
¥
=
-   (C.1) 
 
subject to  
  
t t t t t y E z E 1 - - =p   (C.2) 
 
( ) 1 1 1 1 ] [ - - - + = t t t t c y E p     (4.3) 
 
It is convenient to define  ] [ 1 t t t y E x - = as the state variable and  t t u p =  as the control. We solve this 
problem by the method of Lagrange multipliers. Introduce the Lagrange multiplier  t m , and set to zero the 
derivatives of the Lagrangean expression: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]
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Following a line of reasoning similar to the corresponding case of perfect knowledge (for details see 
Appendix C.1), it can easily be shown that the first-order condition can be written as 
 
( ) 1 , 2 1 1 1 , 1
1 , 2 1 1 , 1
1
] [




t t t t
t t t t t
C c C
C y E C
p
p
  (5.6) 
 
Note that the optimal disinflation policy under passive learning is identical to the commitment policy under 
perfect knowledge, except that the unknown structural persistence parameter ghas been replaced by its 
point estimate  1 - t c .    21
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  (C.14) 
 
Again, a novel feature of the passive learning policy - compared to the central bank’s optimal disinflation 
policy under perfect knowledge - is that the degree of monetary accommodation (the extent to which the 
central bank accommodates private sector inflation expectations) is no longer constant across the 
disinflation, but becomes state-dependent. This means that the central bank’s behaviour changes during the 
disinflation as it collects more information. This can be easily seen from equation (5.6) where the coefficients 
are now time-varying. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
In this paper we have analyze disinflation in two environments. One in which the central bank has perfect 
knowledge, in the sense that it understands and observes the process by which private sector inflation 
expectations are generated, and one in which the central bank has to learn the private sector inflation 
forecasting rule.  
 
For the case of perfect knowledge we found that the optimal disinflation is faster under commitment than 
discretion. Next, in the commitment case the disinflation is less gradual, the higher the central bank’s rate of 
time preference and the higher the degree of persistence in inflation expectations.  
 
With imperfect knowledge results depend on the learning scheme that is employed. A novel feature of the 
passive learning policy - compared to the central bank’s optimal disinflation policy under perfect knowledge 
- is that the degree of monetary accommodation (the extent to which the central bank accommodates private 
sector inflation expectations) is no longer constant across the disinflation, but becomes state-dependent. This 
means that the central bank’s behaviour changes during the disinflation as it collects more information.  
 
There are a number of ways the paper can be extended. One limitation of the present analysis is that there is 
no rational learning of private agents about the monetary policy regime. It would be more plausible if agents 




An example of a paper that looks at the case where the private sector is learning about central bank 
behavior is Andolfatto, Hendry and Moran (2002). Using a standard monetary dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model, they embed a learning mechanism regarding the interest-rate-targeting rule that the 
monetary authorities follow. There the learning mechanism enables optimizing economic agents to distinguish 
                                                 
17 This is modelled by Hoeberichts and Schaling (2000), using Bayesian learning.   22
between transitory shocks to the policy rule and occasional shifts in the inflation target of the monetary policy 
authorities. We see this as one potential avenue for further work.   23
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APPENDIX A: STEADY STATE EQUILIBRIUM 
 
The innovation sequence { } t V  in equation (2.6) satisfies  
 
( ) [ ]
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with  0 1
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= + t tV E  and  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) p q q p p p V E t v - - + - = = 1 1 1
2
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(where I have used that  ( ) ( ) q p q p - + - - ” 1 1 / 1 )
18 
 
From (A.1) we see that  0
^





















S E S E     (A.2) 
where 
^
0 E denotes the private sector expectation conditional on information available at date zero (which 
need not include observation of  0 s ). Observing that  t S E 0
^
 can be interpreted as the probability that  1 = t S  
given information at time zero (denoted  [ ] 1 0 = t S P ), (A.2) can be rewritten 
 
[ ] ( ) p p p S P
t
t - + = = 0 0 1 g     (A.3) 
 
where  [ ] 1 0 0 0 = ” S P p . 
 
From equation (A.3) we can see that for large t the economy is expected to be in the high inflation state 
(state 1) with probability  p , in which case uwould be 
b p . Similarly, the economy will be in the low 
inflation state (state 0) with probability  p - 1 , in which case uwould be zero. Hence, the expected long-run 
level of u(denoted as u) is   
 
                                                 
18 For more details see Hamilton (1989, pp. 360-363).   26
b p u p . =       (A.4) 
From equation (2.3) it then follows that the (unconditional mean) steady state level of inflation (
-
p), is  
 




+ =   (A.5) 
 
APPENDIX B THE COMMITMENT SOLUTION 
 
Now, the central bank’s problem is to choose { }
¥
=t t t p  so as to maximize 
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t t t t E z p p
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t t t - + - + = - - p p g gp p   (3.3) 
It is convenient to define  t t t E x p 1
^
- = as the state variable and  t t u p =  as the control. We solve this 
problem by the method of Lagrange multiplier. Introduce the Lagrange multiplier  t m , and set to zero the 
derivatives of the Lagrangean expression: 
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The central bank’s first-order conditions take the form 
 
0 ) ( ) ( 1
* = + - - - - + t t t t t E x u u u a m dg   (B.4) 
 
( ) t t t x u - = m   (B.5) 
 
First, we find an expression for  1 + t t E m . Leading (B.5) by one period and taking expectations we get: 
 
) ( 1 1 1 + + + - = t t t t t t x E u E E m   (B.6) 
                                                 
19 It is easy to convert the Lagrangean (B.1) into the standard form used by Schaling (2002) by setting  0 = t in (B.1). 
Then the central bank chooses the sequence { }
¥
=0 t t p  rather than { }
¥
=t t t p . 
   27
 
Substituting (B.6) into (B.4), we can derive the Euler equation 
 
( ) 0 ) ( ) ( 1 1
* = - + - - - - + + t t t t t t t x E u E x u u u a dg   (B.7) 
 
In the case of a policy of strict inflation reduction, the rule would be 
 
* u ut =   (B.8) 
 
Similarly, in the case of full accommodation of expectations, the rule would be 
 
t t x u =   (B.9) 
 
Thus, it appears that in case of flexible inflation targeting the rule will be a linear combination of (B.8) and 
(B.9), that is 
* ) 1 ( u c cx u t t - + = , where  1 0 £ £ c . Or alternatively,  
 
2 1 C x C u t t + =   (B.10) 
which is equation (3.6) in the main text (where I have substituted  t t t E x p 1
^
- = and  t t u p = ).  
 
Here the coefficients  1 C  and  2 C remain to be determined, and the prior is that  1 0 1 £ £C and 
*
1 2 ) ( 0 u C C £ £ . Now we identify the coefficients  1 C  and  2 C . 
 
Expectations for the state at period  1 + t  follow from the constraint in (B.1), combining the latter with the 
decision rule for u, we can write: 
 
( ) ( ) q u C x C x E
b
t t t - + - + + = + 1 1
*
2 1 1 p g g g   (B.11) 
 
From (B.10) it follows that  
 
( ) ( ) 2
*
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 ] 1 1 [ C q u C x C C C x E C u E
b
t t t t t + - + - + + = + = + + p g g g   (B.12) 
 
Substituting (B.11) and (B.12) into the Euler equation (B.7) above, and equating constant terms and 
coefficients on the state variables yields the following expressions for  1 C  and  2 C in terms of the structural 
parameters of the model 
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Equation (B.13) implicitly defines the value of  1 C . It can be written as ( ) 1 1 C F C = . Note that the 
function ( ) 1 C F on the right hand side with domain  1 , 0  is monotonically increasing in  1 C , that   28
( )
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2 1 0 1
1
lim


















C . We realize that there is a unique positive 
solution 1 C , which fulfills 
2
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. It can be solved analytically: 
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Similarly, Equation (B.14) implicitly defines the value of  2 C . It can be written as ( ) 2 2 C G C = . Note that the 
function ( ) 2 C G on the right hand side with domain 
* , 0 u  is monotonically increasing in  2 C . Again, we 
realize that there is a unique positive solution
*
2 C . It can be solved analytically: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ] 1 1 1
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u a C q C
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b
  (B.16) 
     
Moreover, it can be easily established that  ( ) 0 lim 1 2 0 =
ﬁ
C C
a and that 
*
2 lim u C
a =
¥ ﬁ .  
 
We are now ready to prove: 
 
PROPOSITION B.1: The higher athe lower the optimal value of the feedback parameter  1 C . 
 





















, this implies that when agoes up, the function  ( ) 1 C F  shifts downward. 
As a consequence, the equilibrium value of  1 C decreases. 
 
PROPOSITION B.2: If  1 C  is smaller than an upper bound 
_
1 C , the higher d the lower the optimal value 
of the feedback parameter  1 C . 
 
Proof:  ( ) [ ]
















. Note that the nominator of this expression is negative if the above condition 
is satisfied. It can be written as 
-







1 .  
 
Numerical results indicate that for our basic parameter configuration (see Table 3.1), the above condition is 
satisfied for the entire range of inflation aversion preferences ( ¥ < < a 0 ). 
 
PROPOSITION B3: If  1 C  is smaller than an upper bound 
_
1 C , the higher g the lower the optimal value of 
the feedback parameter  1 C . 
   29
Proof:  ( ) [ ]















. Note that the nominator of this expression is negative if the above 
condition is satisfied. For more details see Proposition B.2 above.  
 
Numerical results indicate that for our basic parameter configuration (see Table 3.1), the above condition is 
satisfied for the entire range of inflation aversion preferences ( ¥ < < a 0 ). 
 
 
PROPOSITION B4: If  ( )( ) g dg - - - > 1 1 1 C a , the higher 
* u the higher the value of the constant  2 C . 
Proof:  ( )( ) [ ]

















. The nominator of this expression is positive if the above condition 
is satisfied.   
 
 
PROPOSITION B5: The higher athe higher the value of the constant  2 C . 
 
Proof:  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]









+ - - +













To give a numerical example, for our basic parameter configuration (see Table 3.1),  48 . 0 2 » C . If we 
increase a to 0.5, say,  2 C  increases to 0.90. 
 
 
PROPOSITION B6: The higher 
b p the lower the value of the constant  2 C . 
 
Proof:  ( )( )















b .  
 
 
PROPOSITION B7: If  2 C is greater than a lower bound
-
2 C , the higher dthe higher the value of the 
constant  2 C . 
 
Proof:  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] { }
a
C C C C u q G b
+





/ 1 . 1 1 2 1 1 2
* d d g g p g
d
. The nominator of this 
expression is positive if the above condition is satisfied. It can be written as  > 2 C
-
2 C , where 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ] { } 1 / 1




2 + ¶ ¶ + -
¶ ¶ + - - + - -
=
- d d g
d d g p
C C
C C u q
C
b
. For plausible parameter values this condition is 
likely to be satisfied. 
 
To give a numerical example for our basic parameter configuration (see Table 3.1) and  225 . 0 = d , 
45 . 0 2 » C . If we increase d to 0.9, say,  2 C  increases to 0.48. 
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PROPOSITION B8: If  2 C is greater than a lower bound
-
2 C , the higher gthe higher the value of the 
constant  2 C . 
 
Proof:  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) { } ( )[ ]
a
C u C C C C u q C G
b
+





1 / 1 . 1 1 2
*
2 1 1 1
*
2 d dg g g g p g d
g
. The 
nominator of this expression is positive if the above condition is satisfied. It can be written as  > 2 C
-
2 C , 
where  ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) ( ) { } 1 / 1 2







2 + ¶ ¶ + -
- + - + - ¶ ¶ + - -
=
- g g g d
dg g p d g g
C C
C u u q C C
C
b
. For plausible parameter 
values this condition is likely to be satisfied. 
 
For example, for our basic parameter configuration (see Table 3.1) and  2 . 0 = g ,  27 . 0 2 » C . If we 
increasegto 0.9,  2 C  increases to 0.48.  
 
APPENDIX C OPTIMAL LEARNING AND THE VALUE OF EXPERIMENTATION 
 
C.1 PASSIVE LEARNING 
 
In the case of passive learning the central bank ignores the dependence of the current policy action  t p on 
next period’s estimate or beliefs  1 + t q , whereq is a 1 x 2 row vector of state variables containing the mean 
and variance of the estimate, i.e.  [ ]' t t t p c = q . That is, the central bank ignores the constraints (4.4), (4.5) 
and (D.10). 
 
Then, the central bank’s problem is to choose { }
¥
=t t t p  so as to maximize 
 
[ ]
2 2 * ) ( ) ( t t t
t
t p p d z E a E
t
t
t - - - ￿
¥
=
-   (C.1) 
 
subject to  
  




( ) 1 1 1 1 ] [ - - - + = t t t t c y E p   (4.3) 
 
It is convenient to define  t t t y E x 1 - = as the state variable and  t t u p =  as the control. We solve this problem 
by the method of Lagrange multipliers. Introduce the Lagrange multiplier  t m , and set to zero the derivatives 
of the Lagrangean expression: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]






























x u u u a
E L
t











  (C.3)   31
 
The central bank’s first-order conditions take the form 
( ) 0 ) ( ) ( 1
* = + - - - - + t t t t t t c E x u u u a m d   (C.4) 
 
( ) t t t x u - = m   (C.5) 
 
First, we find an expression for  ) ( 1 + t t t c E m . We realize that this can be written as 
) ).( ( ) ( 1 1 + + = t t t t t t t E c E c E m m . When the central bank sets policy at time t, it doesn’t observe  t c , the only 
piece of information that is available at that time is the existing estimate  1 - t c , thus  1 - = t t t c c E , and we have 
 
) .( ) ( 1 1 1 + - + = t t t t t t E c c E m m   (C.6) 
 
Leading (C.5) by one period and taking expectations we get: 
 
) ( 1 1 1 + + + - = t t t t t t x E u E E m   (C.7) 
 
Substituting (C.6) and (C.7) into (C.4), we can derive the Euler equation 
 
( ) 0 ) ( ) ( 1 1 1
* = - + - - - - + + - t t t t t t t t x E u E c x u u u a d   (C.8) 
 
In the case of a policy of strict inflation reduction, the rule would be (B.8). Similarly, in the case of full 
accommodation of (the central bank’s forecast of) private sector inflation expectations, the rule would be 
(B.9). Thus, it appears that in case of flexible inflation targeting the rule will be a linear combination of these 
special cases, that is 
* ) 1 ( u c cx u t t - + = , where  1 0 £ £ c . Or alternatively,  
 
2 1 C x C u t t + =   (B.10) 
 
Here the coefficients  1 C  and  2 C remain to be determined, and the prior is that  1 0 1 £ £C and 
*
1 2 ) ( 0 u C C £ £ . Now we identify the coefficients  1 C  and  2 C . 
 
Expectations for the state at period  1 + t  follow from the constraint in (C.3), combining the latter with the 
decision rule for u, we can write: 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - + + + = + = + = t t t t t t t t t t t c C c x C c u c u c E x E   (C.9) 
 
From (B.10) it follows that  
 
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 ] [ C c C c x C c C C x E C u E t t t t t t t t + + + = + = - - - + +   (C.10) 
 
Substituting (C.9) and (C.10) into the Euler equation (C.8) above, and equating constant terms and 
coefficients on the state variables yields the following expressions for  1 C  and  2 C in terms of the structural 
parameters of the model 
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  (C.11) 
 



























    (C.12) 
 
Equation (C.11) implicitly defines the value of  1 C . It can be written as ( ) 1 1 C F C = . Note that the 






































. We realize that there is a unique positive 






















. It can be solved analytically: 
 




















































    (C.13) 
 
Similarly, Equation (C.12) implicitly defines the value of  2 C . It can be written as ( ) 2 2 C G C = . Note that the 
function ( ) 2 C G on the right hand side with domain 
* , 0 u  is monotonically increasing in  2 C . Again, we 
realize that there is a unique positive solution
*
2 C . It can be solved analytically: 
 
( ) [ ]



















    (C.14) 
     
 
Moreover, it can be easily established that  ( ) 0 lim 1 2 0 =
ﬁ
C C
a and that 
*
2 lim u C
a =
¥ ﬁ .  
 
Finally, the Lagrange multiplier mcan be solved by substituting (B.10) into (C.5) this yields 
 
2 1 ) 1 ( C x C t t + - = m                     (C.15)  
 
APPENDIX D THE CENTRAL BANK’S OPTIMAL FILTERING PROBLEM 
 
In this appendix we derive the central bank’s optimal forecasting rule for private sector inflation expectations 
by applying the Kalman filter.  
 
D.1 State Space Form 
The policymaker’s estimation problem can be put into state-space form by defining the state vector as the 
parameter g. Then the (state) transition equation is 
   33
1 - = t t g g       (D.1) 
 
However, the state is not observed directly. Instead the state of the system is conveyed by an observed 
variable (signal)  t y , which is subject to contamination by noise (measurement error) t e . Thus, the 
measurement equation is 
 
t t t t z y e g + =
'     (D.2) 
 
where the scalar ( ) 1 1
' 1 - - + = ” t t t w z p , and  t e is a serially uncorrelated disturbance with mean zero and 
variance 
2
e s , that is  ( ) 0 = t E e  and  ( )
2
e s e = t Var .
20   
 
D.2 The Kalman Filter 
The technique of the Kalman filter depends on the system that consists of (D.1) and (D.2) and its aim is to 
find unbiased estimates of the sequence of the state  t g  via a recursive process of estimation.
21  
 
The process starts at time  1 = t  say; and it is assumed that prior information on the previous state vector 
0 g is available in the form of an unbiased estimate  0 c , which has been drawn from a distribution with a mean 
of  0 g  and variance  0 p . Depending on the uncertainty surrounding the initial estimate, large (small) values 
should be attributed to  0 p  to reflect the low (high) precision of the initial estimate. In the terminology of 
Bayesian statistics, this is a matter of attributing a diffuse prior distribution to  0 g . 
 
The basic filter is described by four equations governing prediction, (namely equations (D.3), (D.5), (D.6.1) 
and (D.6.2)), and two for updating/smoothing (namely equations (D.9) and (D.12)). These equations are 
derived below. 
 
In each time period, new information on the system is provided by the variable t y ; and estimates of  t g  may 
be formed both before and after the receipt of this information. The estimate of the state at time t formed 
without knowledge of  t y  will be denoted by  1 - t t c ; the estimate that incorporates the information of  t y  will 
be denoted by  t c . 
 
In the absence of information of  t y , the estimate  1 - t t c of  t g  comes directly from equation (D.1) where 
                                                 
20 Note that (D.2) is in the form of an ordinary regression equation. 
21 A process of estimation which keeps pace with the data by generating an estimate of the current state variable with 
each new observation  t y  is described as filtering. The retrospective enhancement of a state estimate, using data - which 
has arisen subsequently - is described as smoothing. The estimation of a future state variable is described as prediction.  
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1 - t g is replaced by  1 - t c . Thus 
 
1 1 - - = t t t c c       (D.3) 
 
Equation (D.3) is the state prediction equation.  
 
The mean-square error of this estimator will be denoted by  ( ) { }
2
1 1 - - - = t t t t t c E p g , whilst that of the 
updated estimator  t c  will be denoted by  ( ) { }
2
t t t c E p - = g . To derive the expression for  1 - t t p in terms of 
1 - t p , we subtract equation (D.3) from equation (D.1) to give 
 
1 1 1 - - - - = - t t t t t c c g g     (D.4) 
 
It follows that the prediction variance is 
 




1 1 - - - - - = - = - = t t t t t t t t p c E c E p g g     (D.5) 
 
Before learning its value, we may predict  t y  from equation (D.2) by replacing  t g  by its estimate  1 - t t c  and 




1 - - = t t t t t c z y E     (D.6.1) 
 
The mean-square-error of this prediction is  ( ) { }
2
1 1 t t t t t y E y E f - - - = . To express  1 - t t f  in terms of  1 - t t p , 
we subtract equation (D.6.1) from equation (D.2) to give the prediction error 
( ) t t t t t t t t t c z y E y e e g + - = - = - - 1
'
1 . Then, since ( ) 1 - - t t t c g  and  t e  are statistically independent, and since 
( )
2






1 e s + = - - t t t t t p z f     (D.6.2) 
 
The business of incorporating the new information provided by  t y  into the estimate of the state variable may 
be regarded as a matter of estimating the parameter  t g  in the system  






























         
 
where  t t t t c g V - = -1 .       
 
By applying the method of generalised least squares (see e.g. Pollock (1999)), we obtain an estimating 
equation for  t g  in the form of  
( ) ( )
( ), ) (









1 1 2 2 ' 1
1
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t
y z c p p





















( ) ( )
1




- + = e s t t t t z p p     (D.8) 
 
is the variance of the estimator.  
 
To give equation (D.7) a form, which is amenable to a recursive procedure, we consider the identity 
 
( ) ( )
( ) 1






















+ - = +
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
c z y z c p





         
 
Using this on the RHS of equation (D.7), and noting that from (D.3)  1 1 - - = t t t c c , gives 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
y c w c w y c c z y c
c z y z p c c
k k k k
se
+ - = - + = - + =
- + =
































- = = = = t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t f w p f z p f z p z p e s k  is commonly described as the Kalman 
gain. Equation (D.9) is equation (4.4) in the main text. 
 
Using (D.8), we can show that  
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( ) ( )
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p z z p
z z p
z p
    (D.10) 
 
where  ( )
2 '
1 t t t z p - is the portion of the prediction error variance due to uncertainty in  1 - t t c  and 
2
e s is the 
portion of the prediction error variance due to the random shock  t e . We can easily see that  













suggesting that as uncertainty with  1 - t t c increases, relatively more weight is given to new information in the 
prediction error,  1
'
- - t t t c z y . This is quite intuitive, since an increase in uncertainty in  1 - t t c may be 
interpreted as a deterioration of the information content of  1 - t t c , relative to that of  1
'
- - t t t c z y . 
 
Equation (D.8) can be rewritten as 
 








- - - + - = t t t t t t t t t t t t p z p z z p p p e s     (D.11) 
 
Combining equation (D.11) with (D.10), and noting that from (D.5)  1 1 - - = t t t p p , the so-called Ricatti 
equation – which provides a means for generating the variance of the state prediction - can be written in 
recursive form as 
 
1 1 1 1
'
1 - - - - - - = - = t t t t t t t t t p w p p z p p k k     (D.12) 
 
which is equation (4.5) in the main text.   
 